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The distinction between competence and performance 
is central to Chomsky's conception of the nature of 
linguistics. The task of the linguist, as Chomsky 
conceives of it, is not to account for what a speaker 
does with language, his performance, but rather to 
characterize his linguistic comp~tence, his knowl-
edge of the language.l Hence we must, according to 
Chomsky, distinguish between competence and perform-
ance in order to arrive at a correct conception of 
the goals of linguistic theory. 
In the years since the publication of Aspects, 
Chomsky's conception of competence has been analysed 
and criticised by various philosophers.2 Chomsky has 
responded and the ensuing controversy has been heated. 
Jerrold Katz, in his book Semantic Theory, reviews 
the dispute and offers a defense of Chomsky's posi-
tion. In this paper I present a critical analysis of 
Katz's defense of Chomsky. The analysis reveals, in 
my opinion, that Katz has not succeeded in vindicating 
the notion of competence. If this is correct, then 
we are justified in viewing that notion, and the entire 
Chomskian framework of which it is such an integral 
part, with suspicion. 
I 
To lay the foundation for my discussion of Katz, 
let me briefly review the problems to which the notion 
of competence gives rise. Chomsky describes a speaker's 
linguis~ic competence as "his knowledge of his lan-
guage." In itself this seems harmless enough. All 
of us would say that speakers have knowledge of their 
native language, in the sense that they can use the 
language to communicate, discriminate between accept-
able and unacceptable sentences, and so forth. How-
ever, Chomsky makes it clear that by "knowledge of a 
language" he has in mind not only a speaker's intui-
tive ability to operate with the language but his knowl-
edge of the rules of the language.' Chomsky further 
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maintains that all normal human beings have knowledge 
of the rules of so-called "um. versal grammar," which 
defines the form which the rules for particular lan-
guages can take. Now of course Chomsky is aware that 
a speaker who is not a linguist is unable to state the 
rules governing his languagg, much less to state the 
rules of universal grammar. He therefore takes the 
position that the speaker has "unconscious" or "tacit• 
knowledge of linguistic rules.7 The problem before 
us may now be stated simply Is Chomsky correct in 
maintaining that every normal human being has uncon-
scious knowledge of the rules of his own language and 
of the rules of "universal grammar"? 
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Before considering what Katz has to say about this 
I want to stress two points regarding the interpreta-
tion of Chomsky's position. First, neither Chomsky nor 
Katz holds that speakers have conscious knowledge of 
linguistic rules. Chomsky himself has called this posi-
tion "absurd" and has accused one of his critics, 
Gilbert Harman,of misrepresenting him on this point.8 
Whether or not this charge is Justified, it is impor-
tant to emphasize that the thesis we shall be discussing 
is that speakers have unconscious knowledge of lin-
guistic rules and that this thesis does not entail that 
they have conscious knowledge of such rules. 
The second point that needs stressing is that 
Chomsky's "competence" is not to be conceived as a 
speaker's ability or capacity to use language. The 
terminology here is somewhat misleading. When we speak 
of a person as being competent, we normally mean to as-
cribe to him some sort of skill or ability. What we 
ordinarily call competence involves what Ryle and other 
philosophers have called knowing-how. Chomsky has made 
it clear, however, that what he calls competence is some-
thinE different from what the ordinary usage of the word 
would tend to suggest. A speaker's competence in Chom-
sky's sense is his knowledge of linguistic rules. Thus 
competence for Chomsky is not identical with a speaker's 
ability to use language, but is rather part of the ex-
planation of that ability. 
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II 
I turn now to Katz's defense of the claim that 
speakers have unconscious knowledge of linguistic rules. 
Katz begins his discussion by saying that philosophers 
such as Gilbert Harman have "taken issue with Chomsky's 
statement of the competence-performance distinction." 
(p. 25)~ He goes on to say that he does not want to 
become involved in the dispute between Chomsky and his 
critics because he thinks it is just "a terminological 
matter." (p. 26) 
I have two problems with what Katz says here. 
First of all, I find it difficult to reconcile his state-
ment that he does not want to become involved in the 
controversy between Chomsky and Harman with the fact 
that he devotes the next eleven paragraphs of his book 
to arguing that Chomsky is right and Harman is wrong. 
Second, and more important, Katz's saying that the 
critics have objected to Chomsky's statement of the com-
petence-performance distinction and that the dispute 
is merely "terminological" seems to reflect a failure 
to appreciate the seriousness of the criticisms that 
have been raised. The point that has been made by 
Harman and others is not that Chomsky has formulated 
the competence-performance distinction improperly but 
that there is !!.Q. such thing as competence as Chomsky has 
described it. Obviously this point is not simply termi-
nological. Competence, according to Chomsky, is what 
the linguist is trying to describe. Thus if there is no 
such thing as competence, it will no longer be clear 
what the linguist is supposed to be trying to do. ~hom­
sky' s theoretical framework for linguistics would have 
collapsed. 
I would expect Chomsky himself to agree with this 
point. Certainly the vigor of his responses to Harman 
suggest that he does not regard the dispute between them 
as merely a matter of terminology. 
In any event, the admission that there is no such 
thing as competence would undermine not only Chomsky's 
conception of linguistics, but also his views on philos-
ophy and psychology. His defense of the philosophical 
doctrine of innate ideas is based on..the claim that 
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people are born with knowledge of the rules of univer-
sal grammar, and his belief that linguistics, as he 
conceives of it, can serve as the model for psychology 
involves the assertion that psychology needs "a con-
cept of what is learned -- a notion of competence --
that lies beyond the cogceptial limits of behaviorist 
psychological theory."l 
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Returning now to Katz's discussion, the next point 
to be noted is that his position regarding unconscious 
knowledge is somewhat different from Chomsky's. Many 
philosophers hold that anything which deserves to be 
called 'knowledge' may be classified either as knowing-
how (1 e , roughly, h~ving a certain skill or ability) 
or knowing-that (i.e., roughly, holding a belief which, 
in virtue of certain characteristics such as being true 
and being justified, constitutes knowledge). Chomsky, 
on the other hand,seems to hold that a speaker's knowl-
edge of linguistic rules is neither a case of knowing-
how noP a case of knowing-that. Our knowledge of such 
rules constitutes, on Chomsky's view, a special third 
kind of knowledge which is not covered by the usual 
dichotomy.11 It is on this point that Chomsky and 
Katz part company. Katz is willing to grant, at least 
for the sake of argument, that a speaker's knowledge 
of the rules is a form of knowing-that. 
It seems to me that Katz's position on this point 
constitutes an improvement over Chomsky's. It is just 
not clear what Chomsky's third kind of knowledge, dif-
ferent from either knowing-how or knowing-thet, could 
be. Moreover, while it would ~efinitely be a mistake 
to construe competence as a form of knowing-how, there 
seems to be no reason for denying that competence is a 
form of knowing-that. It seems fair to understand the 
claim that speakers have unconscious knowledge of rules 
as amounting to the claim that they know unconsciously 
that the rules are such-and-such. 
Having noted that some philosophers view the notion 
of unconscious knowledge with suspicion, Katz considers 
the idea that the notion has been vindicated by psycho-
analytic theory. "Psychology," he says, suggests an 
extension of the concept of knowledge to "what can be 
brought to consciousness under appropriate conditions, 
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for example, the psychoanalytic situation". (p. 27) 
Katz goes on to describe an experiment on the basis of 
which it would be plausible to describe a person as 
having subliminal memories. Such experiments, he says, 
suggest that knowledge encompasses something more than 
conscious knowledge. At this point it begins to appear 
that Katz wants to define unconscious knowledge of lin-
guistic rules by claiming that there is a parallel be-
tween such knowledge and the kind of unconscious knowl-
edge familiar to psychologists. But Katz surprises us 
by pointing out a flaw in what might have seemed a prom-
ising defense of his and Chomsky's position. The problem, 
as Katz says, is that knowledge of linguistic rules is not 
"brought to consciousness in the manner of subliminal 
memories or repressed thoughts." (p. 27) Katz's point 
here can, I take it, be put this way: In making people 
aware of subliminal memories and repressed thoughts we 
normally do not do anything which could naturally be 
called teaching, whereas, on the other hand, the normal 
way of making people aware of linguistic rules is to teach 
them the rules. This being so, it would seem that when a 
person becomes aware of subliminal memories and repressed 
thoughts he simply becomes conscious of what he already 
knew, but that when he becomes aware of linguistic rules 
he has learned something which he did not previously know. 
Thus Katz himself admits that unconscious knowledge 
of linguistic rules is different from the unconscious men-
tal states posited by psychologists, and he therefore con-
cedes that we cannot establish the reality of the former 
by appealing to the latter. But if unconscious knowledge 
of the rules of language is not like the unconscious 
mental processes of the psychologist, what is it like? 
And if the appeal to psychology does not establish the 
reality of our supposed knowledge of linguistic rules, 
what does establish it? 
Katz hints an answer to the first of these questions 
by saying that the real analogue to knowledge of lin-
guistic rules is not the unconscious knowledge of the 
psychologist but the knowledge of geometry displayed by 
the slave boy in Plato's dialogue the Meno. Immediately 
after drawing this comparison Katz writes. "The bias 
on the part of the critic is not against unconscious 
knowledge per se, it is the empiricist bias against un-
conscious knowledge of general p~inciples ••• " (p. 27) 
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Katz's reasoning here is hard to follow In 
the first place it is not at all clear that Socrates 
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is correct in claiming that the slave boy knew geometry 
even before he submitted to Socrates' questioning 
The boy does, after all, start out by giving several 
incorrect answers. Thus it could well be argued 
that the boy initially does not know geometry but 
that he is brought to know it by Socrates' questions. 
Furthermore, even if we waive this objection and 
grant that Meno's slave knew geometry even while 
he was in his cradle, there would still remain an 
important difference between his knowledge and our 
alleged knowledge of linguistic rules In the Meno, 
Socrates gets the boy to see geometric truths merely 
by questioning him He does not tell the boy 
anything about geometry. We thus get the feeling 
that Socrates is pulling knowledge out of the boy 
rather than putting it into him. It is obvious, 
however, that linguistic rules are not normally 
brought to consciousness by a process of Socratic 
questioning. Moreover, it would seem that most of 
the rules that have been proposed by Chomsky and 
his followers could not be brought to consciousness 
in this way Thomas Nagel may be right in claiming 
that certain very simple rules, such as the rule 
for forming regular plurals in English, could be 
elicited from a s~eaker simply by asking him the 
right questions 1 But it seems clear that nothing 
so complicated as the relative clause rule, much 
less the rules of universal grammar, could be 
elicited by any process of questioning 
Finally, the claim that the empiricist is 
"biased" against unconscious knowledge of general 
principles appears to be completely without foundation. 
Up to this point in his discussion, Katz has given 
no good reason for believing that we have unconscious 
knowledge of linguistic rules. Indeed, as we have 
seen, he has not even claimed to have given a 
reason for believing that we have such knowledge 
It seems to me that Katz's allegation of "bias" is 
a manifestation of the unfortunate tendency of some 
linguists and philosophers to assume that doubts 
about Chomsky's doctrines can only be based on 
unreasonable empiricistic preconceptions 
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III 
Toward the end of his discussion of unconscious 
knowledge Katz advances an argument for the conclusion 
that such knowledge must, after all, be ascribed 
to all speakers of the language. The crux of his 
position is summed up in the following passage 
"· •• if supposing that someone knows a rule is 
the only way to explain how he can judge intuitively 
in the manner that he does, then he knows the rule, 
and if he doesn't know it consciously, then we must 
suppose he knows it unconsciously, that is, has 
tacit knowledge of it." (p. 28) Katz maintains 
that a speaker's intuitive knowledge that sentences 
are grammatical, ungrammatical, ambiguous, etc 
can only be explained on the hypothesis that he has 
knowledge of the rules of his language. This 
inference from intuitions about particular sentences 
to knowledge of general rules is, according to 
Katz, "just a special case of the standard form of 
scientific inference from observable effects to 
unobservable causes." (p. 28) In support of the 
claim that a speaker's intuitions are to be 
explained on the hypothesis that he has unconscious 
knowledge, Katz quotes an argument of Fodor 
"If machines and organisms can produce 
behavior of the same type and if descriptions 
of machine computations in terms of rules, 
instructions, etc., that they employ are true 
descriptions of the etiology of their output, 
then the principle that licenses inferences 
from like causes to like effects must license 
us to infer that the tacit knowledge of 
organisms is represented by the programs of 
the machines that 3imulate their behavior " 
(p. 28)I3 
The crux of this argument, Katz tells us, is 
that "the formal rules of the grammar utilized in 
the computations of the machine have real counter-
parts in the causal processes going on in the heads 
of speakers." (p. 29) To summarize. Katz maintains 
that we must assume unconscious knowledge in order 
to explain the intuitions of speakers, and he argues 
for the correctness of this explanation by alleging 
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a parallel between the behavior of human speakers 
and the output of machines programmed with linguistic 
rules 
It seems to me that Fodor's argument does not 
establish the conclusion Katz wishes to draw We 
are told that we can infer a speaker's knowledge 
of rules by way of "the principle that licenses 
inferences from like causes to like effects " The 
conclusion which this principle is supposed to 
license is that the speaker has unconscious knowl-
edge of linguistic rules In order for the principle 
to license this conclusion,however, we would have 
to take it as a premise that the machine has knowl-
edge of the rules This is obviously absurd, and 
we can hardly avoid the absurdity by saying that 
the machine's knowledge is "unconscious " In 
short, Fodor's principle yields the conclusion 
he wants only on the assumption of a false premise 
Fodor's argument does, however, suggest an 
explanation of the speaker's linguistic intuitions 
which is better than the one proposed by Katz The 
machine does not know any rules, but it does have 
an internal mechanism which generates certain sen-
tences If we are to reason "from like causes to 
like effects," the conclusion we ought to draw is 
that the speaker also has an internal mechanism 
which generates his linguistic intuitions But 
from the premis~ that the speaker has such a 
mechanism, the output of which is described by 
the rules of his language, it does not follow that 
the speaker knows the rules--even unconsciously 
IV 
This paper has been devoted almost entirely 
to finding flaws in Katz's arguments It might 
therefore be obJected that even if everything I 
have said is correct, I would not have refuted the 
unconscious-knowledge hypothesis but would only 
have shown that Katz has failed to establish its 
truth To meet this obJection I want to conclude 
by sketching an argument which seems to me to 
show that the hypothesis ought not to be accepted 
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Notice that I said 'ought not to be accepted' 
rather than 'is false'. The distinction is important 
here because, if I am right, the problem with the un-
conscious-knowledge hypothesis is precisely that there 
is no way of showing it to be false. 
A classic example of a pseudo-explanation is the 
case in which someone attempts to "explain" the sleep 
inducing properties of a certain drug by saying that 
the drug possesses a dormitive virtue. It is clear 
that in this case we want to say that no genuine ex-
planation has been provided. But what, precisely, is 
the problem here? It will not do to say that the pro-
posed explanation has no empirical consequences what-
soever, for the defenders of dormitive virtue could 
reply that a consequence of the hypothesis that some-
thing has the dormitive virtue is that people who take 
it tend to feel sleepy. The trouble with the dormi-
tive-virtue hypothesis seems to be, rather, that it 
has no empirical consequences other than those which 
it is supposed to explain. It seems, then, that in 
order to rule out this sort of explanation we must 
adopt some principle such as the following· Let 
ID1, ••• , On} be a consistent set of observation 
sentences, let H be a hypothesis allegedly explain-
ing {01, ••• , On}, let T be our presently-accepted 
scientific theory of the world, and let T' be the 
conjunction of T with H, then H is an adequate ex-
planation of {01, ••• , On} only if T' entails at 
least one observation sentence which is not entailed 
by T and which also is not entailed by the conjunc-
tion of 01, ••• , On.lq (The reference to theories 
accomodates the fact that, strictly speaking, what 
has empirical consequences is not the hypothesis 
taken by itself but the conjunction of the hypothesis 
with current scientific theory. Nevertheless, it is 
briefer, and not, I think, seriously misleading, to 
speak of "the consequences of a hypothesis" without 
alluding to the theory in which the hypothesis is in-
cluded. Hence I shall continue to use this expres-
sion in what follows.) 
The problem with the unconscious-knowledge hy-
pothesis is that it appears to be at odds with this 
principle. For, what empirical consequences does 
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this hypothesis have other than the facts of language 
acquisition and linguistic performance which it is 
supposed to explain? One might think that a hypothesis 
ascribing knowledge to people would have consequences 
with regard to their behavior. However, the claim 
that the knolwedge in question is unconscious has the 
effect of cancelling many of the expectations which we 
would otherwise have had as to its behavioral conse-
quences. Thus we are not, for example, entitied to ex-
pect that a speaker's knowledge of the rules will, 
under certain circumstances, result in his asserting 
that the rules describe his own grammatical intuitions. 
Moreover, it would appear from Katz's discussion that 
we cannot even expect the kinds of behavioral conse-
quences which follow from claims to unconscious knowl-
edge made by psychologists. As we have seen, Katz 
explicitly denies that the unconscious knowledge of the 
psychologist is of the same kind as the unconscious 
knowledge posited by the linguist. It would appear, 
then, that so far as behavior is concerned, the hypo-
thesis that speakers have unconscious knowledge of 
linguistic rules has no empirical consequences beyond 
those it is supposed to explain. 
It might be thought that the empirical consequen-
ces of the unconscious-knowledge hypothesis have to do 
not with the speaker's behavior but with the states of 
his brain According to this suggestion, the hypothe-
sis would predict that there are certain kinds of neural 
structures inside the speaker's head. It might be 
argued, for example, that we should expect to find one 
part of the brain in charge of the phrase-structure com-
ponent of the grammar and another part in charge of the 
transformational component. This suggestion, however, 
is open to two serious obJections. In the first place, 
it is highly dubious that mental states such as knowl-
can be correlated with brain states in such a way 
as suggestion requires I shall not go into the 
issue here but the point has been argued forcefully 
els~where.15 Secondly, even if the needed correlations 
could be made, all that would have been shown is that 
the unconscious-knowledge hypothesis has the same empir-
ical consequenees as another hypothesis, namely the 
hypothesis which simply asserts that the speaker's 
nervous system has those structures, whatever the~ 
are, whose existence is supposed to 
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follow from the hypothesis of unconscious knowledge. 
Given the present state of our ignorance16this second hypothesis would have to be quite vague. One might 
even argue that it would be so vague as to be prac-
tically useless. In any event, the point is that what-
ever empirical consequences might be thought to follow 
from the hypothesis of unconscious knowledge would also 
follow from the straightforward neurological hypothesis. 
Since the empirical content of the hypotheses would 
then be identical, and since the meaning of the second 
hypothesis is so much clearer than that of the first, 
the proper course for the linguist would be to abandon 
the unconscious-knowledge hypothesis in favor of the 
hypothesis about neurological structures. 
In summary, it seems that the defenders of uncon-
scious knowledge are faced with a dilemma: Either 
their hypothesis has no empirical content at all, in 
which case unconscious knowledge is the dormitive virtue 
of linguistics, or else the hypothesis ought to be re-
jected in favor of a more modest hypothesis concerning 
the structure of the speaker's nervous system.17 
APPENDIX 
The presentation of my paper led to some spirited 
discussions with other participants in the conference. 
In this Appendix I want to discuss some of the issues 
that arose in those discussions. 
Objection 1: To deny the reality of competence is to 
deny the obvious. There can be no doubt that speakers 
have the ability to distinguish grammatical from un-
grammatical sentences, to spot ambiguities, and so 
forth. 
~: This objection overlooks the fact that, when 
Chomsky speaks of competence, he has in mind not the 
speaker's linguistic abilities and intuitions, but the 
unconscious knowledge of linguistic rules which is 
supposed to explain those intuitions. As the discus-
sion in this paper has shown, the reality of such knowl-
edge is anything but obvious. 
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ObJection 2 We need the competence-performance dis-
tinction in linguistics. fo reJect this distinction is 
to go back to the bad old days in which linguists con-
cerned themselves only with the externals of speech be-
havior without allowing for the complex grammatical rules 
which underlie such behavior. 
~ This obJection seems to assume that the only 
alternative to accepting what Chomsky says about com-
petence is a return to a radical behaviorism which re-
jects all innate structures of any complexity. But 
this view of the matter is too simple. We can agree 
with Chomsky that any adequate account of linguistic 
phenomena must posit complex innate structures without 
agreeing that a speaker has any knowledge of linguistic 
rules. In this way we would have steered a course be-
tween the Scylla of behaviorism and the Charybdis of 
unconscious knowledge. 
Objection 3 The points made in this paper are irrel-
evant to linguistics. Whether or not we choose to 
speak of unconscious knowledge will make no difference 
whatsoever to how linguists go about their business. 
~ Of course the linguist can always take the 
attitude that he is just going to do his work and not 
bother about "irrelevant" methodological or philosophi-
cal issues. Such an attitude, however, would be an 
odd one for a follower of Chomsky to take. One of 
Chomsky's major contributions has been to show the 
danger of just grinding out "results" without stopping 
to wonder what the results mean or whether they are 
of any importance Research in any discipline is al-
ways guided by, and interpreted in the light of, the 
methodological presuppositions of that discipline. 
And the assumption that there is such a thing as 
competence is one of the fundamental presuppositions 
of contemporary work in linguistics 
ObJection 4 It might be possible to bring certain 
rules to a speaker's consciousness in a manner which 
did not involve teaching him the rules. ' If this were 
done, then surely it would be reasonable t~ 8 say that the speaker had known the rules all along 
( 
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Reply: Granted. rr the rule is a simple one, such as 
the rule for forming regular plurals, knowledge of it 
may ~easonably be ascribed even to speakers with no 
training in linguistics. But such simple rules are 
completely different from most of the rules which 
would be included ina generative grammar. 
It might be tempting to press the objection by 
suggesting that even the most complicated rules might 
be brought to consciousness by some elaborate process 
of questioning, reinforcement of certain responses, 
and so forth. It would seem, however, that the more 
elaborate such a process was, the less plausible it 
would be to say that the rules which it brought to 
consciousness were rules which the speaker knew 
(unconsciously) all along. 
NOTES 
1Chomsky (1965:3-9) 
2see the papers by Harman and Stich, and several 
of the papers in Hook. 
3Katz's discussion covers pp. 24-29. Page 




7Hook (87, 153). 
8Hook (86). 
9Katz cites Harman's 1967 paper as well as his 
contribution to the Hook volume. 
lOchomsky (1972 72). 
llHook (86-87). 
12Hook (175). 
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l3Katz is quoting from Fodor (1968 640). 
14Note that all my argument requires, and all 
that I am claiming, is that this is a necessary 
condition for the adequacy of an explanation. 
15see the paper by Goldberg. 
16This was pointed out to me by Victoria Fromkin. 
17r would like to thank Victoria Fromkin and 
James Mccawley for stimulating comments which in-
cited me to write this fourth section as well as the 
following appendix 
18This point was raised by James Mccawley. 
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